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Abstract--The ‘8rain drain’” problem is not so much a question of the numbers who migrate as 
the distortion in training systems and economic structures that their mobility implies. The persistence 
of the problem reflects the ineffectiveness of the policies so far implemented to reduce it. This ineffective- 
ness stems largely from the inadequacy of the standard neoclassical framework of analysis, which 
also misrepresents the effects of the “brain drain”. The fundamental inadequacy of this analysis derives 
from the fact that it deals with the response of individuals ta a number of variables without taking 
account of the structure within which individual decisions are made and of the relevant interdependen- 
ties and dynamic effects. The most important aspect of this structure is the existence of an international 
market in professional skills into which the educated elite of the Third World is more or fess integraQ& 
lo the benefit of their salary ievels and, in a process of institutional determination of salaries. those 
of all who can plausibly claim “compatibility” with them. The condition of integration into this inter- 
national market is the possession of internationally negotiable qualifications and international negotia- 
bility implies. to a varying degree, lack of relation to local needs. 
The question of international (medical) migration is of interest not so much in itself, but because 
of what it reveals about the nature of particular (health care) systems and the socio-political structures 
in which they operate. IF everything else were to stay much the same the reduction of fmedical) emi- 
gration would probably make no difference at all to the welfare of most of the population of the 
Third World. In the same vein. the solution to the problem raised by these international movements 
are not lo be found within the movements themselves but in necessary changes within the framework 
of specific national (health care) systems and. of course, the social, political and class structures in 
which they exist. 
Statistics on the outflow of trained personnel from 
developing to developed countries are not only of 
poor quality [I]. but usuafiy also considerably out 
of date. Thus the most recent year for which relevant 
data is available is 1973 or even. in the case of many 
important countries. 1972 [2]. The picture shown by 
these statistics is one of some falling away in the early 
seventies from the highest levels of outflow of the 
sixties. but of still substantial numbers in aggregate, 
with the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Canada as the major recipient countries and with 
doctors. nurses, teachers, engineers and scientists as 
the predominant categories of manpower invoIved. 
Since the end of 1973 there have been several new 
developments. The capitalist world economy has 
entered and is still suffering a serious recession. The 
rate of expansion in the demand not oniy for econ- 
omic resource based professionals such as engineers, 
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but aiso for school and university teachers and poss- 
ibly even medical graduates has been considerably 
reduced. At the same time output from medical 
schools in Britain and North America has been sig- 
nificantty raised and is likely to increase further in 
the next decade [3]. On the other hand, the oil- 
producing countries, particularly in the Middle East, 
have emerged as new areas of rising demand for high- 
level manpower. And in the European Economic 
Community moves towards the liberalization of 
professional licensure regulations, coinciding with 
Britain’s entry, have increased the opportunities for 
movement between and therefore possibly into the 
EEC countries. 
While a change in the direction of “‘brain drain” 
[4] thus seems fairly certain, the prospects for the 
size of the outflow, although in any case likely to 
be below pre-1974 levets at least for some years, 
depend to some extent on the timing and pace of 
recovery from recession. fn the cas’e of professions 
other than doctors the reaction to recession in the 
developed countries has been to cut back on training 
provision, which in time may mean short-term 
employment opportunities for qualified immigrants as 
economic activity picks up. Even in the case of the 
medical profession, with its very different institutional 
framework, the rate of increase in demand may in, 
some instances outstrip that of supply. Moreover, to 
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the extent that Third World professionals fill spec$c 
roles in developed countries, opportunities for them 
might persist even though the gap between ooerall 
demand and supply-were closing. 
Even if the numbers actually migrating were to fall 
drastically over the next few years this would not be 
the end of the “brain drain” and its related problems. 
As things now stand the training institutions of the 
Third World have the capacity to produce increasing 
numbers of internationally acceptable and potentially 
mobile professionals, to be added to the world’s 
“reserve army” of high-level manpower to be drawn 
on at will by the developed countries. As will emerge 
in what follows, the problem is nof so much the 
numbers who migrare as fhe distortion in training sys- 
ferns and economic strucrures that their mobility im- 
plies. 
The persistence of the problem reflects the ineffec- 
tiveness of the policies so far implemented to reduce 
it. This ineffectiveness stems largely. it will be argued 
here, from the inadequacy of the standard framework 
of analysis, which also misrepresents the effects of 
the brain drain. In the following pages the assump- 
tions underlying. and the policy prescriptions arising 
from. the traditional approach are examined and an 
alternative framework is suggested-with alternative 
implications for policy. 
ANALYSIS 
The standard framework of analysis of the eflects 
of “brain drain” is that of neoclassical welfare econo- 
mics. The typical neoclassical view is that those 
remaining behind suffer no loss in welfare as a result 
of the migration of an educated person from a poor 
to a rich country. Grubel and Scott [S], for instance, 
maintain that “the emigrant removes both his contri- 
bution to national output and the income that gives 
him a claim to this share, so that other incomes 
remain unchanged”. Even in its own terms such 
analysis is fallacious. The proposition that “brain 
drain” will leave the income of those remaining 
behind unchanged holds only if a marginal loss of 
a single skilled worker is involved. But, as Sen 
remarks [6], “who is really interested in a one-man 
‘brain drain?” It is easy enough to show that, given 
normal neoclassical assumptions about demand con- 
ditions, the loss of output resulting from substantial 
emigration will exceed the consequent fall in the wage 
bill. In other words the average income of those 
remaining behind will fall; in which case there is a 
situation in which some (the emigrants) gain and 
some (the non-emigrants) lose and whether the results 
are regarded as net gain or net loss will depend on 
how the income units of each group are translated 
into welfare units. It seems at least plausible to sug- 
gest that when, as is usually the case, the gainers 
already have considerably higher incomes than the 
losers there is a presumption in favour of net loss 
from brain drain [7]. 
Moreover, so far the argument has accepted the 
underlying neoclassical assumption of perfect compe- 
tition in the relevant markets. In the real world of 
market imperfections, however, the impact of a skilled 
worker on an economy is not completely reflected 
in the size of his income; there will be indirect or 
“external” effects on the output and incomes of others 
(such as. e.g. a doctor’s effect on the health and physi- 
cal productivity of the labour force, an agronomist‘s 
on farmers’ crop yields, etc.). The usual neoclassical 
attitude to such externalities might be summed up 
as “because no one has yet demonstrated that these 
externalities are significant. we can disregard them”. 
A more convincing recognition of the reality of the 
disintegrated and administered labour markets of the 
Third World would be to concede that not only are 
externalities important but that they are likely to be 
significantly more important for developing countries 
than for developed ones. 
In fact it is interesting to note that the most careful 
attempt to measure the effects of “brain drain” within 
the neoclassical framework [S] does concede this 
point, defining benefits lost to the developing country 
and benefits gained by the developed country in terms 
of losses and gains of lifetime income streams. bur 
adjusting for estimated externalities and for inrrcl-mar- 
ginal gains or losses in excess of those indicated 4~. 
market wages and s&vies. On this basis, using the 
actual figures for the numbers of Third World immi- 
grant engineers, physicians and social and natural 
scientists into the U.S. in 1970, the authors calculate 
that this immigration represented a transfer to the 
U.S. of around $3700 million, compared with U.S. 
development assistance to developing countries in the 
same year of $3100 million. 
As might be expected neoclassical analysis of the 
causes of “brain drain” puts the emphasis heavily on 
economic motives. The standard hypothesis, the one 
that most empirical work on “brain drain” has set 
out to test, runs broadly as follows. The net inflow 
of educated persons from a poor to a rich country 
will be the greater, the greater the relevant salary dif- 
ferentials between the countries; the easier it is for 
an immigrant to get an appropriate and satisfying 
job in the rich country; the more difficult it is for 
a potential emigrant to get such a job in the poor 
country; and the lower the cost of migration and relo- 
cation in the rich country. 
There can be little quarrel with the view that 
econo’mic considerations (thus broadly defined) pre- 
dominate. Certainly this is what migrants tend to tell 
surveyors inquiring into their motives. The recent 
UNITAR survey [9], for instance. carried out in 
France, Canada, the U.S., Sri Lanka, Greece, Ghana. 
Brazil and Colombia, suggests adequacy of income, 
quality of jobs, number of jobs and the interests of 
children as the strongest influences on migration 
plans at all stages. Similarly an earlier UNITAR [lo] 
survey of Cameroon, Colombia, Lebanon, the Philip- 
pines and Trinidad and Tobago found the economic 
factor, including the employment situation, working 
conditions and salaries, to be the most important one. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that rates 
of migration respond to marginal changes in these 
economic variables. The data are too poor to be con- 
fident about the results of regression analysis, but the 
hypothesis that the pattern of immigration is related 
to (i) the income difference between the country of 
origin and the U.S. and (ii) cost of transportation in- 
volved in the movement does not come well out of 
an analysis by Sen [l l] of immigration of less devel- 
oped country engineers, doctors, dentists and natural 
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and social scientists into the U.S. in 1966 and 1967. point at issue is not so much this international nego- 
Except for the case of doctors and dentists. where tiability and consequent mobility as such, but the 
special institutional factors apply, the strongest effects these have upon the possibility of creating 
explanation of the pattern seems to be in terms of more relevant professional cadres. within the Third 
the number of students doing graduate work in the World. 
U.S. These results are highly iemative. but in genera! 
they are consistent with the fundamental critique of 
the standard framework to which the discussion will 
now turn. 
The fundamental inadequacy of neoclassical anaiy- 
sis of brain drain derives from the fact that it deals 
with the response of individuals t@ a number of vari- 
ables without taking account of the structure within 
which individual decisions are made and of the rele- 
vant interdependencies and dynamic effects. 
The most important aspect of this structure is the 
existence of an international market in professional 
skills into which the educated elite of the Third World 
is more or less integrated, to the benefit of their salary 
levels and, in a process of institutional determination 
of salaries. those of all who can plausibly claim “com- 
parability” with them [12]. The condition of integ- 
ration into this international market is the possession 
of int~marionall~~ negoriable qua~frcarions and inter- 
national negotiability implies, to a varying degree, 
lack of relation to local needs. In other words Third 
World professionals acquire international mobility 
either by studying abroad or by attending a local in- 
stitution with curricula and syllabi appropriate to the 
job context of the developed rather than the less de- 
veloped countries [13]. 
In addition to this qualitative distortion of educa- 
tion and training systems the tying of local profes- 
sionals into the international rather than the local 
market, and the consequently higher anticipated pri- 
vate rate of return on their training open to them, 
build in an overproduction of inappropriate skills as 
the state responds to the excess demand for training 
school places by building more training schools or 
by sending more students overseas. This is the point 
overlooked by economists who talk about overflow 
rather than drain. Their view [14] that the “brain 
drain” is no problem because there is a surplus of 
educated manpower at home can be seen to be exces- 
sively static, to say the least. 
A!! this fits in well with Sen’s conclusion, already 
discussed. that the most powerful explanation of the 
pattern of Third World immigration into the U.S. is 
provided by the number of nationals doing graduate 
work in the U.S. Some qualifications, clearly, are 
more negotiable than others and none more so than 
those of a receiving country’s own graduate schoois. 
In generd one might predtct that the less interna- 
tionally acceptable are the quai~fi~ations obtained 
(whether at home or abroad) by a category of profes- 
sionals the lower the incidence of brain drain. This 
genera! line of reasoning is supported by Myint for 
ex,mpie. who observes that one of the reasons why 
“the actual ‘brain drain’ of engineers from Asian 
countries has been much less than of doctors” is that 
“professional affiliations between the advanced and 
the underdeveloped countries seem to be weaker for 
engineers than for doctors. so that an engineer trained 
in Asia is less likely to obtain a professional appoint- 
ment in the U.S. or Britain without further training 
in these countries” [l-S]. It must be stressed that the 
DOCTOR CASE STUDY 
The “brain drain” is made up of many kinds of 
professionals, and of movements between different 
types of countries. However, serious international 
public concern over the brain drain issue has been 
reserved primarily to the movement of professionals 
from the less to the more developed countries. This 
continues to be the situation despite the increasing 
volume of professional migration from poorer devel- 
oping countries to, in particular. oil and other mineral 
rich parts of the Third World. In some countries 
movements of this latter type are even being encour- 
aged as an alternative to emigration to industrialized 
countries, and also because they are not generally of 
a permanent character. Such movements are also 
sometimes supported/justified on the basis of their 
potential for creating feelings of political solidarity 
between Third World countries. In any event the 
volume of movement of professionals from, say, the 
Indian subcontinent to the Middle East is stitl far 
less than to the industrialized countries and although 
such movements are still on the increase they are 
characterized more by circulating than one way flows 
(although some migrants use a posting in the Middle 
East or Africa as the basis of a further move to 
Europe or North America). It remains the case that 
the movement of professionals from developing to de- 
veloped countries remains at the heart of the “brain 
drain” issue as a matter of significant international 
public concern. 
The out-migration of Third World professionals 
has been dominated by movements to the industria- 
lized English-speaking countries; that is, the U.S., the 
U.K., Canada and Australia. There are atso relatively 
important flows into the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many and France. Because such a substantial part 
of all professional education within the Common- 
wealth is in the EngIish language, its graduates are 
especially at risk with regard to future emigration. 
Movements within the Commonwealth itself are also 
facilitated by similarities in higher education and pro- 
fessional institutional structures. 
The professional composition of the migrants varies 
according to country and has changed over time in 
keeping with the needs (demands) of particular indus- 
trialized countries. The groups that have dominated 
the migration statistics since 1967 (the year U.S. pro- 
fessional immigration rose by over 60 per cent) are 
scientists, engineers and doctors. In spite of the over- 
all significance of these categories there are other, 
smaller groups that constitute areas of concern in par- 
ticular countries, for example .accountants in Sri 
Lanka and teachers in the Commonwealth Carib- 
bean. Although there are conditions that are specific 
to the migration of each category of professional and 
to each country, there are also broader and more sig- 
nificant issues that apply more or less “across the 
board”. These issues are well illustrated in the case 
of the migration of health workers in genera! and 
doctors in particular. 
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Within the United Nations and most other inter- 
national bodies concern over the “brain drain” 
extends to all categories of professional migrants. 
However. within both donor and recipient countries 
it is doctor migration that tends to generate the 
greatest volume of interest and feeling. It is also im- 
portant to note that even in quantitative terms doctor 
migration has come to dominate international profes- 
sional movements as the increased output of science 
and engineering graduates in the United States in par- 
ticular, coupted with economic recession, has reduced 
the demand for immigrants with these skills. 
Doctors and other health workers, then, constitute 
the most significant group of migrants from the point 
of view of both developing and developed countries. 
The flow of doctors from developing to developed 
countries is limited primarily to movements into the 
U.S., the U.K. and Canada. with minor flows to a 
few other countries. It must not be imagined that the 
countries into which the doctors are migrating are 
receiving them with enthusiasm: in fact they are ac- 
ceptable only because they are meeting an existing 
demand for a greater number of doctors (or nurses, 
etc.) than the recipient countries have been able (or 
willing) to meet from their own resources. The most 
important question that arises with regard to this 
migration is why the Third World continues to supply 
medical doctors and other health workers to meet 
the needs of a few western industrialized countries, 
thereby depriving themselves of significant numbers 
of their own scarce health workers. 
Perhaps because the medical brain drain is most 
often discussed by members of the medical profession 
the stock “solutions” offered for the problem appear 
to be directed primarily toward costly improvements 
in the training and working conditions of the poten- 
tial migrants. It is the contention here that it is just 
such improvements that have created in the past. 
and are encouraging now, the basic conditions that 
have led in the first place to international medical 
migrations: that is. they widen further the gap 
between effective economic demand for medical skills 
and the cost of utilizing these still more expen- 
sively trained and paid medical practitioners. In 
fdCt, the international migration of doctors is pri- 
marily the result-as well as a measure-of the mal- 
training and related malutilization of medical man- 
power, and graduates in particular. In the broader 
sense this is equally true in the case of the U.K. or 
India. 
Medical migration is a reasonable response to 
national and international inequaliti~ in the distribu- 
tion of income. Like other workers. doctors sell their 
wares in the market place. In fact the present national 
and international distribution of the stock of doctors 
and the flows of additional medical graduates are 
closely correlated to the overall pattern of income 
distribution within and between countries. The distri- 
bution of doctors not only reflects income inequali- 
ties, but is in itself a part of that inequality. It is 
a stark truth that medical skills are not distributed 
in keeping with need-as shown by morbidity and 
mortality indices-but rather in accordance with the 
workings of the market place in a world of sharp 
income equalities. The same conditions that encour- 
age a concentration of medical skills in the metropoli- 
tan areas of Third World countries assure the inter- 
national movements of these same skills. 
Given the poverty of most of the population of 
developing countries. a health care system which is 
either part of, or oriented to the private sector and 
those with money incomes will become virtually irre- 
levant (in any positive sense) to at least one of the 
“two nations” which comprise each underdeveloped 
country. The permanent migration of high-level medi- 
cal manpower arises from the production of personnel 
to meet the health care requirements of both nations: 
the one which can pay for the services of medical 
doctors and the one which cannot. It has even been 
argued by those who accept the market place as the 
final arbiter of who shall or shall not enjoy the benefit 
of medical care that there is, in fact, no “brain drain” 
of professional manpower, but rather only an “over- 
flow” relative to effective economic demand. 
The picture, then. is something as follows: 
(a) Traditional medical education is based on the 
values and requirements (“standards”) of those with 
sufficient income to purchase private medical care: 
at the same time the “native practitioners”. who are 
the only ones able to meet the effective economic 
demand of those with very small (or no) money in- 
come, are labelled as quacks and either barred from 
practice outright or forced to operate without benefit 
of state support either for facilities or training. On 
the same basis there is opposition, usually successful, 
to the production of medical assistants and other 
types of alternatives to the graduate medical practi- 
tioner. 
(b) Based upon a desire to change existing national 
doctor-population ratios that are very different from 
those to be found in industrialized countries there 
is increasing pressure for the training of greater 
numbers of doctors; additional medical graduates 
then lead to the demand for post-graduate specializa- 
tions and large urban, especially teaching hospitals 
as places of employment; these in turn lead to more 
graduates and specialists. There is then little left for 
basic rural primary care services or even for basic 
pharmaceutical products, especially at the “peri- 
phery”, as doctors’ salaries and other related special- 
ized requirements take up an ever increasing propor- 
tion of very limited health sector resources. The privi- 
leged position won by the doctors encourages the 
entire process until there is an oversupply relative to 
the employment aspirations of the graduates and they 
emigrate, if they can. Meanwhile, the bulk of the 
popufation remains without benefit not only of doc- 
tors’ services. but of any type of heafth worker at 
all. 
(c) An important element in all of this is the grow- 
ing demand for higher education for the children of 
an expanding middle class. At the same time these 
same middle classes provide the major markets for 
doctors’ services. However, there cannot be doc- 
tordmiddle class) family ratios that are low enough 
to prevent oversupply relative to effective economic 
demand. The very expensive training costs of medical 
doctors (which are so high just because they are 
trained in keeping with private sector “standards” and 
traditions) means that most of the popuiation cannot 
possibly afford the ex~ctations~requirements of the 
medical graduates. Therefore, there is an “overflow” 
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of these graduates to those parts of the world where 
demand is greater than the current supply of doctors, 
most notably North America. (The movement to Bri- 
tain has been targeiy a replacement of those Britons 
who have already emigrated.) The very possibility of 
lucrative overseas employment, in turn, encourages 
the output of still greater numbers of medical gradu- 
ates having no prospect of employment in their home 
countries, Even now, in some countries at least. medi- 
cal graduates are consciously being produced for the 
international market. 
The market for doctors of the type currently being 
trained is extremely limited in the context of most 
Third World countries. Although a more equitable 
distribution of income would probably lead to a 
greater overall demand for the services of medical 
practitioners (including those of a nongraduate var- 
iety) it might also lead, in the short run anyway, to 
a decline in demand for those services being produced 
by highly specialized graduates and an increase in 
emigration of such people. In practice this would 
depend upon the rate at which income redistribution 
and the consequent demand for different types of 
medical practitioners was to proceed, the volume of 
output of graduates from the medical schools. adjust- 
ments in medical school curricula, government poii- 
ties with regard to the control of intending emigrants, 
and the level of international demand for the poten- 
tial emigres. The precise balance of such factors could 
only be found in the context of specific countries. In 
any event, it is broadly the case that so long as doc- 
tors are trained in keeping with private sector tradi- 
tions and the requirements of a very limited urban 
middle class, just so long will there be an “overflow” 
from those countries with a small demand for such 
training to those with a greater (unmet) demand for 
such skills. 
In Asia it is possibie to see most of the distortions 
that arise from overproduction of the wrong type of 
medical practitioner. This overproduction has led to 
the massive migration of medical graduates from such 
countries as India, Pakistan. Sri Lanka and the Phi- 
lippines. In response to this situation Sri Lanka has 
curtailed medical school output and India ended 
expansion of intake, but Pakistan and Bangladesh are 
in the process of doubling intake into medical 
schools. at least partly to make up for emigration. 
In some Indian states the glut of doctors demands 
that virtually ail health planning be centred around 
the need to employ these high-status professionals, 
thus further distorting the health delivery system. In 
the Philippines the output of doctors is very much 
related to the American market for the product. In 
almost ail countries the relative or absolute oversup 
ply of medical graduates having an almost totally 
hospital oriented training is adding to the pressures 
for the construction of still more urban hospitals 
rather than higher priority rural facilities. 
In a number of countries extensive emigration is 
coupled with inflows from other countries. Thus 
Caribbean Commonwealth doctors emigrate to North 
America and Nigerian and Ghanaian medical gradu- 
ates find employment in the U.K.. while their govern- 
ments recruit replacements from countries such as 
India and Sri Lanka. There are also movements from 
smaller and poorer countries to larger and richer ones 
within given regions, e.g. the Caribbean Common- 
wealth or West Africa. 
The training of doctors, with respect to both 
numbers and curriculum “standards”, is based upon 
the assumption that health care delivery systems must 
be based upon the availability of professionals with 
up to 20 years of basic schooling and medical educa- 
tion, which then can become the basis for many more 
years of specialist training. These assumptions are 
held in spite of the well established and pubiicised 
fact that in ail countries of the world the vast bulk 
of illness and mortality does not require the attention 
of highly-trained practitioners of the medical sciences. 
Of course, this situation is particularly clear in coun- 
tries characterized by levels of infant mortality of any- 
where between 50 and 200 per 1000 live births. The 
type of training under discussion also reinforces the 
desire for urban/hospital/private medical practice to 
the detriment of rural/health centre/pubiic health 
work. 
The number of highly-trained medical practitioners 
(registered doctors) planned for production is gener- 
ally based upon some sort of doctor-population ratio. 
Such ratios not only do not consider the basic disease 
pattern of a‘country, and thus the need for doctors, 
but also ignore the possibilities for medical graduates 
to fuifii their employment expectations and the conse- 
quent effects upon their distribution and functions. 
In fact, the planned output of doctors is generally 
not even related to the availability of other types of 
health workers. Thus the illogical situation arises of 
there being more doctors in employment in many 
countries than there are nurses or other categories 
of key paramedical and auxiliary staff. In some parts 
of the world there can be found doctors in rural 
clinics without either supporting staff or the possibi- 
lity of doing immunizations or providing a drug, at 
least partly because health ministry budgets have 
been so badly distorted by the need to provide 
salaries for expensiveiy trained doctors (and in some 
cases registered nurses). 
Most international migration occurs when the 
economic demand for general or specialist doctors’ 
services in a particular country has been saturated 
(although in certain instances the situation has been 
reached in which students are trained specifically with 
the intention of emigrating). At present urban demand 
is great enough to support about as many doctors 
in the capital city of many a developing country as 
can be found in a large European or American city. 
However, effective rural demand cannot support more 
than a handful of conventional doctors per million 
of the population. The only way to change that rural 
ratio is to change the level of demand and so make 
it possible for doctors (or nongraduate medical practi- 
tioners) to iind employment in the rural areas or 
small towns of their own countries rather than 
abroad. (It must be added that effective economic 
demand need not be stimulated only through finan- 
cial payments to doctors, in the form either of fees 
or salaries. but through the provision of a number 
of other employment incentives.) 
On their arrival in North America or the U.K. doc- 
tors and nurses from the Third World mostly take 
up low-status employment in the less desirable hospi- 
tals. In fact without the presence of tens of thousands 
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of doctors from the less developed countries the hos- 
pital systems of the U.S. and U.K. could not continue 
to function. The dependence of these countries on 
foreign medical graduates is a reflection of deficiencies 
in their own training programmes. and/or systems for 
delivering health care. 
The unmet demand for medical doctors has been 
most marked in the U.S. This situation has arisen 
because, primarily as a result of pressure from the 
organized medical profession, intake and output from 
U.S. medical schools had been held more or less con- 
stant from the end of the Second World War to the 
late 1960s. In the interim U.S. demand for doctors 
had become so great that by 1973 there were over 
12,000 new medical registrations in that country of 
foreign medical graduates (55 per cent of the total 
of all new registrations [16]). In that same year of 
almost 16,700 licentiates representing additions to un- 
resrricred medical practice in the U.S. over 7400 (44.5 
per cent) were graduates of foreign medical schools. 
Well over three-quarters of these graduates were from 
developing countries. One U.S. study [17] found that 
of all foreign educated doctors in the country in 1963 
almost 84 per cent were still there in 1971. Of those 
who had come to the U.S. nominally for temporary 
training 74 per cent were still resident in the country 
at the end of the eight-year period. Estimates for the 
U.K. indicate that in the years preceding 1973 and 
1974 the gross annual inflow of doctors into the 
country came to about 3000, with the net gain by 
the U.K. being about 1000 per annum. In 1973 and 
1974, the gross inflow is estimated to have been 2000 
and the net gain 700. The year 1975 may have seen 
a balanced inflow and outflow of about 1000 in each 
direction. 
The policies of key industrial countries concerning 
the immigration of (especially) Third World doctors 
are being reshaped in keeping with very substantial 
increases in output from their medical schools. In the 
U.S. medical school intake has almost doubled over 
the past decade and will provide an output by 1980 
of approximately 15,000 per annum. In Britain medi- 
cal school intake has increased by about 50 per cent 
over the past decade and will have almost doubled 
by 1980 to provide an output of over 4000 graduates 
per annum. Canadian output had doubled by 1976 
from its 1963 base of around 800. In Australia the 
500 medical school graduates of 1962 will have in- 
creased to over 1200 by 1980, and in New Zealand 
output will have almost tripled from 110 to 320 dur- 
ing the years 1972-1981. Taken together, medical 
school output in the four wealthy Commonwealth 
countries will have increased by around 150 per cent 
between the early 1960s and 1980. 
Although it may be some years before it will 
become possible for medical employers in countries 
such as the U.S. or the U.K. to find citizen replace- 
ments for all the foreign-born doctors already in their 
countries not yet in protected types of employment. 
e.g. junior hospital doctors, current output from their 
medical schools should be sufficient to reduce rather 
quickly the intake of additional immigrant doctors. 
In fact, as a result of increases in output coupled with 
growing concern over many aspects of the medical 
brain drain, Britain, Canada and Australia have 
already taken major steps to limit medical immig- 
ration. Although similar new initiatives have not yet 
been undertaken in the case of the U.S.. based upon 
the current state of discussion in that country. there 
is reason to anticipate the development of more re- 
strictive medical immigration policies in the not too 
distant future. It is worth noting that the reduction 
or end of medical migration to Canada and Australia 
and possibly the U.S. will also mean a sharp reduc- 
tion in British medical emigration and thus that 
country’s dependence on doctors from abroad. 
As a result of new immigration policies on the part 
of the industrialized countries it is likely that over 
the next five to ten years medical migration from the 
less developed to the industrialized countries will 
have been reduced very substantially, perhaps to a 
very few indeed! This fact seems not yet to be suffi- 
ciently appreciated and apparently in some countries 
at least there is discussion/planning for increased 
medical school output based upon the expectation of 
continued doctor migration. This discussion takes the 
form of acceptance of medical migration as a continu- 
ing fact of life and sometimes even proposes payments 
to donor countries by recipient countries for the 
“lost” doctors who, presumably, then would be 
trained even more closely in keeping with the needs 
of the receiving industrialised countries. To expand 
medical schools on the basis of expected continued 
migration would be a grave error and could only per- 
petuate the continued production of an inappropriate 
type of graduate. The situation has gone so far. in 
some countries at least, that it almost appears as if 
migration has become a necessary fact of life to justify 
the continuing (over) production of inappropriately 
trained medical graduates. Actually much of the 
ambivalence of Third World countries over the brain 
drain issue is to be found here. On the one hand 
there is the desire to continue with the output of in- 
creasing numbers of “internationally acceptable” 
medical graduates, and on the other, the inability to 
either meet the expectations or be able to utilize very 
many such graduates. 
In almost all developing countries medical educa- 
tion is said to be based on the dual principles of 
“having medical education match the country’s 
needs” and “raising standards to keep up with the 
most modern developments”. Of course. these “most 
modern developments” are determined by contempor- 
ary practice in London or New York, and conse- 
quently are mostly unrelated to the problems and 
possibilities of developing countries. Although the 
highest of re/euanr standards must always be aimed 
at, if it is the case that the standards by which medical 
education is actually measured are not relevant to. 
say, India or Ghana then it is highly unlikely that 
the “raising” of those standards will increase the qua- 
lity of medical care available to most Indians or 
Ghanaians. In the conflict between “relevant” medical 
education and higher “standards” it is invariably the 
relevance that loses out, to a significant degree 
because of the fears of medical professionals of being 
“cut off” from the greater world of medicine as it 
is practiced in the richer countries. 
It is likely that an end to medical migration from 
poorer to richer countries is likely to occur more 
because of increasing production and proper utiliza- 
tion of medical graduates by (particularly) the U.S.. 
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Canada and the U.K. rather than from any other 
single factor. The question then will be whether or 
not Third World doctors will be willing to accept 
work in the smaller towns of their countries (if not 
the countryside itself) in the absence of international 
alternatives or whether they will leave medical prac- 
tice entirely. The basic problems connected with the 
brain drain of medical doctors are unlikely to be 
solved as long as countries continue to (over) produce 
inappropriate types of medical graduates. If medical 
doctors continue to be trained by poor countries to 
fill nonexistent teaching hospital/consultant type 
posts. it will be inevitable that at least some of them 
will (attempt to) emigrate to richer countries that 
have been unable to meet from their own resources 
the demand for those services. If we begin with a 
situation in which some parts of the world are rich 
enough to support a high level of economic demand 
for medical services while others cannot, and then 
allow free market forces to determine the allocation 
of scarce medical resources, inevitably doctors as pre- 
sently trained and utilised will (attempt to) move in 
the direction of the richer regions of the world. 
International medical movements are particularly 
harmful in the ways in which they help to distort 
the educational and health care systems of developing 
countries. Given the nature of these systems, the 
medical brain drain is not by itself a problem: either 
jobs do not exist for those who emigrate or else health 
workers will not take those that are available. It fol- 
lows that the return home of the emigrants is not 
by itself a good thing. Data on returned doctors [IS] 
show that they do not work outside the urban areas, 
and many leave the public sector altogether in favour 
of private practice. Even the further emigration of 
those who have already been “programmed” by their 
education to join the ranks of the migrants need not 
be considered a very serious problem. What does 
matter is that countries which are losing their gradu- 
ates learn from their experience and act upon it. The 
international movements discussed here are the logi- 
cal extension of the kinds of health care systems to 
be seen in most developing countries. So long as 
health care is primarily available within the traditions 
and context of the market place it is inevitable for 
any oversupply of doctors (relative to economic 
demand in any particular national context) to over- 
flow into the world market, and the very existence 
of this world market will prevent the market mechan- 
ism from bringing the supply of doctors into line with 
demand. Even in the U.K.. where health care is 
largely free at point of delivery. the oversupply of 
specialists relative to specialist (consultant) -demand 
as determined by the National Health Service, 
coupled with buoyant North American demand for 
specialist services. is making for continued medical 
emigration. 
The question of international medical migration is 
of interest not so much in itself. but because of what 
it reveals about the nature of particular health care 
systems and the socio-political structures in which 
they operate. If everything else were to stay much 
the same the reduction of medical emigration would 
probably make no difference at all to the welfare of 
most of the population of countries such as India 
or Jamaica. In the same vein. the solution to the 
problems raised by these international movements are 
not to be found within the movements themselves but 
in necessary changes within the framework of specific 
national health care systems and, of course, the social, 
political and class structures in which they exist. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most of the usual policy prescriptions on brain 
drain are derived from the neoclassical framework of 
analysis. Within this framework the archetypical pres- 
cription is that nothing should be done about it since 
the gains from “brain drain” on a world scale 
outweigh the losses, even though these are not equit- 
ably distributed between countries. It has been argued 
that such complacency is unjustified on the grounds 
both of the internal logic of the economic theory on 
which it is based and of its neglect of more fundamen- 
tal issues. 
If it is accepted that there is a problem but an 
orthodox view of its causes is still taken, then the 
solution implied by neoclassical analysis is that of 
change in monetary rewards and working conditions. 
A typical statement of this position is that of Bald- 
win [ 193, summarizing the recommendations of the 
1970 Education and World Affairs (EWA) Committee 
of which he was a member: “The EWA viewpoint 
amounts to saying that professional men the world 
over have much the same requirements for job satis- 
faction and, unless the traditional cultures and pay 
scales of many brain-losing countries (developed and 
less developed alike) can adapt to these requirements, 
then, in Kenneth Boulding’s phrase, ‘high-level man- 
power with get-up-and-go will get up and go”‘. Simi- 
lar recommendations, if less forthrightly expressed, 
can be found in countless national and international 
reports on brain drain, including for instance that of 
a committee of the Sri Lanka Cabinet [20] and the 
Colombo Plan Bureau [21]. 
The problem with such recommendations, even in 
their own terms, is that the changes in monetary and 
non-monetary rewards necessary to stop the brain 
drain may be much larger than is practically conceiv- 
able [22]. A similar point might be made about 
changes in standards of working conditions. More- 
over, to try to pay international transfer earnings to 
the internationally mobile (particularly since other 
groups of top salary earners would plausibly claim 
“comparability” with them) would not only reduce 
the numbers that could be absorbed at home but 
would also make domestic income distribution even 
less equal [23]. 
The difficulty of meeting international (i.e. rich 
country) wage and other employment standards may 
be one reason why policy prescribers and govern- 
ments often resort to emigration controls and bond- 
ing schemes intended to control potential emigrants. 
Controls over passports and foreign exchange 
obviously can be an effective means of preventing 
people from leaving a country where the will and 
capacity to operate them efficiently exists. Bonding 
schemes may be less effective in this respect, only 
postponing the date on which people leave rather 
than preventing their leaving and inviting ingenuity 
in evading bonds on the part of those trained at home 
and bond breaking by those trained overseas [24]. 
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Moreover a problem with both controls and bonding 
schemes is that those retained by these methods are 
likely to be frustrated, demoralized and conservative, 
forming a particular obstacle to programmes of 
reform such as those discussed below. However, it 
is also possible for such groups later to become radi- 
cal dissenters from the “system”. 
Still within the- neoclassical framework another 
policy prescription might be to reduce the salary gap 
and incentive to migrate by effectively lowering the 
rewards of migrant professionals at their destination 
rather than raising their rewards at home. This in 
effect is what the recent *-Bhagwati income tax” pro- 
posal amounts to [25]. 
A tax, which could be progressive or proportional, 
woutd be collected from immigrant less-developed 
country (LDC) professionals by the tax authorities 
of the host developed country (DC) over a limited 
period and eventually handed over under United 
Nations auspices to the government of the country 
of origin. The impact of such a scheme would 
obviously depend on the elasticity of response to the 
tax. If, as preliminary calculations [26] suggest, tax 
rates would have to be unacceptably punitive for the 
tax to have more than a marginal effect on the 
number of migrants, the scheme would be little differ- 
ent in effect from straight government-to-government 
compe~at~on (as recommended, e.g. by UNCTAD 
[27] or, for that matter. from the contracts actually 
signed for the “export” of professional manpower 
from LDCs (e.g. Filipino nurses to Austria and South 
Korean nurses and aides to West Germany, Switzer- 
land and Japan). Such schemes amount in effect to 
an acceptance of the debilitating structural conse- 
quences of integration into the international market 
for professional skills, already described above. This 
applies particularly strongly to the export contracts, 
which institutionalize a continuing distortion of train- 
ing and education systems and salary structures in 
the country of origin. Vigorous pressure by Third 
World governments under UNCTAD auspices for 
compensation for “brain drain” must of course con- 
tinue, but compensation cannot be seen as a “‘solu- 
tion“ for the problems involved. 
So far the discussion has been concerned with the 
policy implications arising from the standard neo- 
classical framework of analysis and had found such 
policy measures to be as unsatisfactory as the frame- 
work on which they are based. If on the other hand 
an alternative framework of analysis (already dis- 
cussed) which regards “brain drain” as a reflection 
of integration into an international market in profes- 
sional skills is adopted. then the only way of achiev- 
ing a substantial impact on the drain (and on the 
more serious internal distortions that it reflects) is 
w~~~~~uwff~ front rhut ~~?u~~~~. This would involve 
substantial changes in educational policy aimed at 
training for internal needs rather than for external 
markets. As the authors of the United Nations Ecosoc 
report [28] point out, a “policy to train personnel 
to be functional in the environment of developing 
countries will have the direct effect of making them 
dis-functional for the developed countries and thus 
reduce their migration”. It would also have wider im- 
plications, as will emerge. 
Questions of political feasibility are obviously 
raised by such a policy, but before confronting them 
it is important to be clear about the range of policy 
possibiiities implied by a programme of withdrawal. 
The Commonwealth offers a unique forum for the 
discussion of mutually agreeable solutions to prob- 
lems but it may be useful. to begin with. to dis- 
tinguish between policy measures to be taken by LDC 
governments and those to be taken by DC govern- 
ments. 
For LDC Corit~rtonwralrlr yocrrnrtimr.s a programme 
of withdrawal from the international market in pro- 
fessional skills would involve the following: 
(a) An end to the use of DC (usually British) qualifi- 
cations in local training institutions, in the few cases 
where this practice continues. 
(b) An end to the sitting of foreign professional 
examinations in LDCs (particularly the U.S. 
ECFMG) and to advertisement and recruitment for 
posts in DCs (in this respect the operation of DC 
based correspondence college might also be looked 
into). 
(c) Disaffiliation from DC-dominated international 
professional associations, which usually see the estab- 
lishment of a common standard and inter-recognition 
of national qualifications as one of their aims, and 
exploration of the possibility of setting up associ- 
ations of LDC professionals committed to greater 
relevance: obviously this would involve a critical re- 
examination of the role of Commonwealth profes- 
sional associations. As Johnson and Caygill [293. 
show, most Commonwealth professional groupings 
are working towards the establishment of a common 
standard, with particularly tight systems of inter- 
recognition in the medical and architectural profes- 
sions. 
(d) The sending of students on more relevant and 
thus probably “less negotiable” overseas courses, in 
cases where the training was not currently available 
at home, and preferably on relevant courses in other 
LDCS. 
(e) The development of local courses and qualinca- 
tions which were both highly suitable to the needs 
of the indigenous economy and therefore probably 
less acceptable to DC employers and training insti- 
tutions. in the case of the medical profession the prin- 
ciples on which such redesigning would be based are 
fairly clear. In the case of production based profes- 
sions (e.g. engineering, accountancy) the task of 
changing the content and balance of training might 
be more difficult, but even a change in length of 
courses and title of qualifications would affect nego- 
tiability-and the process would be reinforced by the 
other policy measures. To gain support for this policy 
the cost to the nation of an individual’s (inappro- 
priate) higher education should be well advert&d. 
(f) The development of new centres of higher educa- 
tion and training on a regional LDC basis as an alter- 
native to DC training in cases where skills are too 
specialized and/or needed in too small quantities to 
justify providing training at home. 
(g) The use of a national language as the medium 
of instruction in courses and textbooks, an important 
aid to insulation as in the cases of Japan and China. 
(h) Changes on the demand side, i.e. in the structure 
of rewards and in job content. The opportunity, 
offered by withdrawal from the international market, 
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would be taken to bring the structure of rewards (and 
associated private rates of return on different types 
of training) into line with social priorities, since there 
is little point in trying to reform education and train- 
ing in the face of contrary pulls from the market. 
At the same time a redefinition in job content. again 
in line with social priorities, would be needed, parallel 
to the educational reforms already discussed. 
(i) The use of scholarships policy, foreign exchange 
and passport controls to discourage overseas study 
for the acquisition of negotiable qualifications. This 
might be reinforced by making local/relevant post- 
graduate training and experience preconditions for 
government employment. 
(j) Recognition of the wider implications of such 
a programme. For instance, in the case of production- 
based professions changes in job content would prob- 
ably imply changes in technology, which may not be 
possible without changes in the nature of products, 
and these changes in turn may be dependent on 
changes in the structure of consumer demand and 
thus income distribution and social structure. More- 
over, because multinational corporations bring the in- 
ternational market for managerial skills to the door- 
step of many Third World countries. representing a 
second form of integration into the international 
market, they would have to be dealt with if the full 
benefits of withdrawal to the local wage and salary 
structure were to be obtained [303. In other words, 
when all the interdependences are taken into account 
withdrawal begins to look somewhat comprehensive. 
(k) The restriction of the output of professionals 
by LDCs to the number that can be absorbed at 
home, even at the risk of some shortages in the short 
run [31]. This would be an attempt to break the 
dynamic, circular interconnection between excess sup- 
ply in LDCs and excess demand in DCs. The knowl- 
edge on the part of DC authorities that the supply 
of “excess” Third World professionals is likely to dry 
up would be a powerful impetus towards DC self- 
sufficiency. And, as already emphasized, withdrawal 
from the international market in skills would itself 
reduce the pressure of demand for places in LDC 
training institutions, thus easing the task of reducing 
intake into and output from these institutions. 
Of course it is one thing to set out the logical impli- 
cations of the objective of ending “brain drain” and 
the internal distortions associated with it, and quite 
another to recommend these measures as an immedi- 
ately implementable programme in all countries. 
Members of the affected professions in most cases 
would feel bound to oppose such a policy. Moreover, 
government decision takers themselves might well be 
unwilling to dismantle a structure which yields them 
substantial benefits of one kind or another. A pre- 
requisite of implementation of a programme of with- 
drawal would be the existence of a government wilf- 
ing to transcend such narrow material interests and 
capable of either gaining the cooperation of the estab- 
lished professions or bypassing them. As far as short- 
term strategy is concerned, in most countries it might 
well be better to avoid confrontation with the estab- 
lished professions. allowing their members to come 
and go freely without trying to force (or bribe) them 
to stay at home. The use of special incentives and 
controls to retain the internationally mobile may 
reduce net outflow in the short run, but could 
strengthen the opposition to a longer term solution. 
initial concentration on the more positive elements 
in the programme. such as the establishment of new 
training centres. might also be strategically advisable. 
For DC Commonwealth governments a programme 
of withdrawal, or disintegration of the international 
market in professional skills, would imply the follow- 
ing: 
(a) Cooperation with LDC governments in the 
phasing out of the use of DC qualifications and in 
the withdrawal of DC examinations, recruiting teams 
and advertisements from LDCs. 
(b) in cu~~u~f~r~on with UK g~~er~me~ts the with- 
holding of recognition by DC authorities of LDC 
qualifications and the control of LDC entrants to 
training courses in DCs. A decision such as that 
recently made by the U.K. General Medical Council 
to withhold recognition of Indian medical qualifica- 
tions (if it were made in consultation and not unilater- 
ally as was the case) would be welcomed by LDC 
governments, in the context of a programme of with- 
drawal, rather than deplored as an affront to national 
dignity. 
(c) A sympathetic attitude towards the reshaping 
of international professional associations, particularly 
those of the Commonwealth. along the lines suggested 
above. 
(d) A change of emphasis in the provision of techni- 
cal assistance awards towards third-country training. 
particularly for courses in other LDCs, but also 
allowing for the possibility of attending more relevant 
and less negotiable courses in other DCs. The aim 
would be for an accelerated reduction in the number 
of LDC trainees in developed countries, again in con- 
sultation with LDC governments. 
(e) Technical assistance for the redefinition of job 
content in LDC professions in line with social priori- 
ties, and for the development of the alternative curri- 
cula, syllabi and structures implied by this redefini- 
tion; also for assistance with manpower planning 
directed towards creating a closer match between the 
output of LDC professional manpower and absorp- 
tion capacity. 
(f) As a major part of the educational assistance 
programme, support for the development of the new 
regional centers of relevant higher education and 
training. This would include finance for the necessary 
feasibility studies and surveys of past experience in 
such cooperation, as well as for the current capital 
and recurrent costs of the institutions. 
(g) If requested and if feasible, assistance for the 
development of courses and textbooks in non-“inter- 
national” languages. 
(h) Afso, if requested, assistance with studies of the 
problems involved in bringing the structure of efTec- 
tive demand into line with the social priorities reflec- 
ted in the redesign of job content, etc. 
(i) Continued progress towards self-sufficiency in 
the DCs’ markets for professionals. The problem in 
the past has lain in the awareness by DC authorities 
of the advantages (in cost terms anyway) of importing 
professionals rather than training their own. It seems 
that professional associatibns in DCs are now begin- 
ning to become aware of the implications for their 
own material interests of this process and hence aban- 
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doning traditional policies of restricting their own 
numbers as well as pressing for a reduction in reliance 
on immigrants. DC authorities, in consultation with 
their LDC counterparts in the Commonwealth. 
should continue to accede to this pressure and resist 
the temptation to draw on the still large reserve army 
of Third World professionals. In keeping with this 
policy closer monitoring of the flows of LDC profes- 
sionals into and out of DCs would be required. 
The implications of the above programme have 
been spelled out separately for LDC and DC govern- 
ments, but it goes without saying that, within the 
Commonwealth, the most effective mode of imple- 
mentation would be through mutual consultation and 
agreement between the governments of the less and 
more developed countries. Moreover, it is recognised 
that the very implementability of a programme of 
withdrawal and the optimum strategy for such imple- 
mentation will vary from country to country. As such. 
it would be useful to study under different circum- 
stances the possibilities and potential effects of the 
implementation of the recommended strategy of with- 
drawal. Rather than continue with general “‘brain- 
drain’ studies”. which would imply that too little is 
as yet known about the phenomenon even to be able 
to propose a strategy of action, research on particular 
professional groups should be conducted in specific 
countries with a view towards testing the applicability 
of the framework put forward in this report. In prac- 
tice, the best way to give specific form to the general 
policy recommendations suggested in this report is 
to study and plan for their application in the case 
of a particular professional group (or groups) under 
specific national conditions. For many of the reasons 
indicated earlier. doctors constitute a particularly in- 
teresting group for study. Commonwealth govern- 
ments should be asked to express potential interest 
in such studies. Appropriate funding is likely to be 
available from any one of a number of bilateral and 
multilateral sources. 
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